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We study the impact of the publication of central bank’s macroeconomic
projections on the dynamic properties of an economy where: (i) private agents
have incomplete information and form their expectations using recursive learn-
ing algorithms, (ii) the short-term nominal interest rate is set as a linear func-
tion of the deviations of inﬂation and real output from their target level and
(iii) the central bank, ignoring the exact mechanism used by private agents to
form expectations, assumes that it can be reasonably approximated by per-
fect rationality and releases macroeconomic projections consistent with this
assumption.
Results in terms of stability of the equilibrium and speed of convergence of
the learning process crucially depend on the set of macroeconomic projections
released by the central bank. In particular, while the publication of inﬂation
and output gap projections enlarges the set of interest rate rules associated
with stable equilibria under learning and helps agents to learn faster, the
announcement of the interest rate path exerts the opposite eﬀect. In the
latter case, in order to stabilize expectations and to speed up the learning
process the response of the policy instrument to inﬂation should be stronger
than under no announcement.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: E58, E52, E43, D83.
Keywords: Monetary policy, Communication, Interest rates, Learning, Speed
of Convergence.
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Non-technical .summary
In .the .last .two .decades .there .has .been .a .substantial .change .in .the .attitude .of .most .central .
banks’ .communication .strategies . .Until .the .end .of .the .80s, .the .conventional .wisdom .was .that .
“secrecy” .about .monetary .policy .decisions .would .make .monetary .policy .more .effective . .In .
terms .of .communication, .this .translated .into .central .bankers .speaking .in .an .opaque .and .convo-
luted .language . .Today .the .old .view .has .been .replaced .by .a .new .one .which .greatly .emphasizes .
the .need .for .clarity .in .the .central .banks .communications .and .regards .transparency .as .manda-
tory .
Despite .the .growing .recognition .of .the .importance .of .transparency .in .monetary .policy-
making, .no .consensus .has .emerged .– .either .among .academics .or .among .central .banks .– .on .
what .the .appropriate .degree .of .transparency .is, .what .constitutes .an .“optimal” .communication .
strategy .and .what .are .the .best .instruments .to .enforce .it . .
Among .the .most .debated .aspects .of .central .banks .communication .there .is .the .degree .of .
openness .concerning .the .release .of .information .about .the .future .evolution .of .macroeconomic .
variables .and, .in .particular, .of .the .policy .intentions . .This .can .be .done .at .different .levels .of .
precision, .from .the .release .of .vague .verbal .hints .to .the .publication .of .unambiguous .numerical .
projections .
The .main .advantage .associated .with .the .use .of .more .precise .communication .obviously .
lies .in .the .fact .that .it .allows .a .stricter .control .of .private .expectations .and, .in .turn, .greater .mac-
roeconomic .stability . .On .the .other .hand, .it .has .been .argued .that .a .communication .strategy .
based .on .the .release .of .precise .information .about .macroeconomic .expectations .might .involve .
a .series .of .drawbacks . . .In .particular .recent .studies .have .reported .the .possibility .that .an .explicit .
announcement .of .central .bank’s .expectations .and .of .its .policy .intentions, .might .put .credibility .
at .risk, .especially .when .the .public .ignores .its .conditional .nature .or .misinterprets .the .precision .
of .the .received .information . .
The .unresolved .debate .among .central .bankers .and .researchers .about .benefits .and .costs .
associated .with .the .disclosure .of .information .about .central .bank’s .macroeconomic .expecta-
tions .provides .the .key .motivation .for .our .analysis . .Our .contribution .to .this .debate .starts .from .
the .observation .that .an .important .issue .that .has .attracted . .only .marginal .interest .in .the .recent .
literature .is .the .analysis .of .the .effects .of .the .announcement .of .macroeconomic .projections .in .an .
environment .where .agents .are .learning .
We .analyze .an .environment .in .which .private .agents .have .an .incomplete .understanding .of .
the .functioning .of .the .economy .and .forecast .its .dynamics .using .a .learning .algorithm .on .past .
data . .Moreover .we .assume .that .the .central .bank .is .endowed .with .complete .information .about .
the .current .state .of .the .economy .and .that .it .publishes .macroeconomic .projections .constructed .
under .the .hypothesis .of .rational .expectations . .We .consider .this .last .hypothesis .to .be .a .plausible .Non-technical summary
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and .realistic .description .of .the .way .in .which .many .of .the .institutions .that .announce .macroeco-
nomic .projections .obtain .their .forecasts . .The .public .is .then .assumed .to .form .its .macroeconomic .
expectations .as .a .weighted .average .of .the .projections .released .by .the .central .bank .and .the .pre-
diction .obtained .through .its .learning .algorithm .
We .study .the .impact .of .the .publication .of .central .bank’s .macroeconomic .projections .on .
the .macroeconomic .stability .and .on .the .speed .of .convergence .of .the .learning .process .of .private .
agents . .
It .turns .out .that .results .crucially .depend .on .the .set .of .macroeconomic .projections .released .
by .the .central .bank . .In .particular, .we .show .that .the .release .of .interest .rate .projections .slows .the .
learning .process .and, .if .the .policy .rule .of .the .central .bank .is .not .sufficiently .aggressive .against .
inflation, . .it .amplifies .initial .expectations .errors .and .generates .instability . .On .the .contrary, .
independently .of .the .policy .rule .adopted .by .the .central .bank, .the .release .of .projections .about .
inflation .and .output .gap .helps .agents .to .learn .faster .and .favors .the .stability .of .equilibria .under .
learning .
Our .analysis .provides .new .results .in .favor .of .a .prudential .approach .in .disclosing .infor-
mation .about .expected .interest .rates .and .suggests .that .particular .attention .should .be .paid .to .
those .situations .in .which .private .agents, .in .forming .their .expectations, .put .a .large .weight .on .the .
announcement .of .the .interest .rate .path . .In .those .cases .in .fact .the .set .of .policy .rules .that .guar-
antees .stability .and .a .fast .process .of .convergence .of .expectations .could .be .even .smaller .than .
the .one .associated .with .a .communication .strategy .which .is .completely .silent .about .central .bank .
macroeconomic .expectations .and .policy .inclinations .
It .is .finally .worthwhile .to .notice .that .our .analysis .is .not .necessarily .against .the .publica-
tion .of .interest .rate .projections .when .agents .are .learning . .If .on .one .side .we .have .concluded .that .
in .this .case .the .publication .of .rational .interest .rate .projection .might .threaten .the .stability .of .the .
economy, .on .the .other .we .cannot .exclude .that .there .might .exist .alternative .interest .rate .projec-
tions .which .can .virtuously .interact .with .private .learning .so .to .strengthen .the .stability .of .the .
economy .and .increase .the .speed .of .convergence .of .private .expectations .towards .rationality .Introduction
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1
1 Introduction
The current commonly-held view about monetary policy is that it inﬂuences eco-
nomic decisions mainly through its impact on expectations (Blinder, 2000; Wood-
ford, 2005; Svensson, 2006). One way in which a credible central bank can directly
aﬀect private expectations is through the release of information about its own view
on the future evolution of macroeconomic variables and, in particular, of its policy
intentions. This can be done at diﬀerent levels of precision, from the release of vague
verbal hints to the publication of unambiguous numerical projections.1 It has been
argued that the main advantage associated with the use of more precise communi-
cation is that it allows a stricter control of private expectations and, in turn, greater
macroeconomic stability (Woodford, 2005; Rudebush and Williams, 2008).2 How-
ever, it has also been pointed out that the release of accurate information about
macroeconomic expectations might involve a series of drawbacks. On top of the
general claim that the provision of public information is not necessarily beneﬁcial
(Morris and Shin, 2002), recent studies have reported the possibility that an explicit
announcement of central bank’s expectations, and in particular of its policy inten-
tions, might reduce credibility, especially when the public ignores its conditional
nature or misinterprets the precision of the received information (Mishkin, 2004;
Khan, 2007; Woodford, 2005; Rudebusch and Williams, 2008). The tension be-
tween beneﬁts and costs associated with the disclosure of information about central
bank’s macroeconomic expectations remains unresolved.
Our contribution to this debate starts from the observation that an important
issue that has received minor attention in the literature is the analysis of the eﬀects
of the announcement of macroeconomic projections in an environment where agents
are learning. An exception in this respect is the work of Eusepi and Preston (2010).
In their model, monetary policy stabilization is conducted in the presence of two
informational frictions. First, the central bank has imperfect information about the
state of the economy and sets the current interest rate as a function of its forecast
of the current inﬂation and output gap. Second, private agents have an incomplete
1For an empirical analysis of the eﬀects of qualitative announcements of monetary policy in-
tentions see Bernanke, Rehinart, and Sack, 2004; Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson, 2005; and
Rudebusch, 2006. For the eﬀects of the publication of numerical interest rate paths see, Archer,
2005; Moessner and Nelson, 2008; and Ferrero and Secchi, 2009.
2Other positive eﬀects of the release of precise information regarding the future evolution of the
economy are that (i) it also enhances the eﬃcient pricing of ﬁnancial assets (Archer, 2005; Kahn,
2007; Svensson, 2004), (ii) it increases the central bank’s accountability (Mishkin, 2004) and (iii)
it fosters the production of good forecasts by the central bank (Archer, 2005).
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economy are that (i) it also enhances the eﬃcient pricing of ﬁnancial assets (Archer, 2005; Kahn,
2007; Svensson, 2004), (ii) it increases the central bank’s accountability (Mishkin, 2004) and (iii)
it fosters the production of good forecasts by the central bank (Archer, 2005).
understanding of the functioning of the economy and forecast the variables which
are relevant to their decision process using past data. In such an environment, where
self-fulﬁlling expectations are possible, it is shown that the provision of detailed in-
formation about policy intentions favors the alignment of private and central bank’s
expectations – anchoring of expectations – thus restoring macroeconomic stability.
In this work we analyze an economy which shares with Eusepi and Preston (2010)
the assumptions that the information available to private agents is incomplete and
that they update their expectations using recursive learning algorithms. Moreover,
also in our model the central bank implements monetary policy according to Taylor
rules. However, we depart from their framework in assuming that the central bank is
endowed with complete information about the current state of the economy and that
it publishes macroeconomic projections based on the hypothesis that private agents
are perfectly rational. We believes this hypothesis represents in a plausible and real-
istic way what is done by most of the central banks which disclose their expectations
in the form of macroeconomic projections.3 The public is then assumed to form its
macroeconomic expectations as a weighted average of the projections released by
the central bank and the prediction obtained through its learning algorithm.4
We study the impact of the publication of central bank’s macroeconomic pro-
jections on the stability of the equilibrium and on the speed of convergence of the
learning process of private agents. It turns out that results crucially depend on
the set of macroeconomic projections released by the central bank. In particular
we show that the release of interest rate projections restricts the set of policy rules
3The Norges Bank produces forecasts using a core macroeconomic DSGE model with ”rational
agents reacting to exogenous disturbances” (Brubakk et al, 2006), the Swedish Riksbank uses a
macroeconomic general equilibrium model derived under the assumptions of ”optimizing behaviors
and rational expectations” (Adolfson et al., 2007) and the Central Bank of Iceland uses a model
where expectations ”are assumed to be rational, i.e. consistent with the model structure (model
consistent expectations)”. The Reserve Bank of New Zealand represents, in part, an exception
as at the core of its Forecasting and Policy System has a general equilibrium macro-model where
expectations are modeled ”as some weighted combination of the model-consistent forecast and some
other function of the recent data” (Black et al., 1997). Learning, however, is not taken explicitly
into account. For completeness it should also be noticed that central banks are aware of the
limits of macroeconomic models and also of the rational expectation hypothesis. In describing the
model used at the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Black et al. (1997) observe that ”a valuable
next step would be to specify how agents learn about the new policy rules, although as yet there
is no generally-accepted theory of learning in macroeconomics”. For this reason macroeconomic
projections are often ”corrected” with judgmental factors before being disclosed to the public. The
eﬀect of this judgment component on the learning process of private agents is an interesting issue
only partially addressed in this paper – see Section 5 – and it deserves further research.
4Similarly, we may assume that a fraction of private agents in the economy uses its own learning
procedure to form expectations, while the remaining fraction fully internalizes the central bank’s
announcement.Introduction
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consistent with a stable equilibrium and reduces the speed of learning. This result
overturns the main conclusion of Eusepi and Preston (2010) which states that more
transparency about future policy rates favors macroeconomic stability. On the con-
trary the publication of projections about inﬂation and output gap helps agents to
learn faster and enlarges the set of monetary policies associated with stable equilibria
under learning.
The result that the disclosure of the interest rate projections undermines the
macroeconomic stability when the interest rule adopted by the central bank is not
suﬃciently aggressive against inﬂation can be explained as follows. In a New-
Keynesian framework where private agents’ are learning, an initial (positive) ex-
pectation bias leads to higher inﬂation both directly through the Phillips curve and
indirectly through the real interest rate that aﬀects the output gap in the IS curve.
A policy rule that reacts to inﬂation (and output gap) introduces a feedback element
in the IS curve that helps to oﬀset the initial bias – if the response to inﬂation is
suﬃciently large. However, by publishing the interest rate projections obtained un-
der the (incorrect) assumption that private agents are rational, the central bank is
not taking into account the systematic mistakes that private agents are doing along
the learning process and, therefore, reduces its ability to contrast the cumulative
movement away from the rational expectation equilibrium (REE) through the inter-
est rate rule – or in other terms it weakens the positive feedback element in the IS
curve. As a result initial expectations biases tend to be ampliﬁed by the announce-
ment, agents need a longer period of time to learn and the convergence toward the
REE is slower. The overall system becomes more vulnerable to self-fulﬁlling expec-
tations. This implies that in order to obtain stability under learning and to favor
a fast convergence of the learning process, a central bank which decides to publish
the interest rate path obtained under the assumption that private agents are fully
rational should also choose a policy rule characterized by a response to inﬂation
which is stronger than in the case of no announcement.
Publishing output gap and inﬂation projections has opposite implications. While
the information about the policy rate (the instrument variable of the model) is indi-
rectly exploited by private agents in order to form expectations about future inﬂation
and output gap (the control variables of the model), information about these two
variables is used directly to predict their future behaviors. Initial expectation biases
are immediately reduced with no need for the stabilizing properties of interest rate
rules that by responding to actual (or expected) inﬂation and output gap introduce
the positive feedback in the IS curve. Therefore, by announcing its inﬂation andIntroduction
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a fast convergence of the learning process, a central bank which decides to publish
the interest rate path obtained under the assumption that private agents are fully
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Publishing output gap and inﬂation projections has opposite implications. While
the information about the policy rate (the instrument variable of the model) is indi-
rectly exploited by private agents in order to form expectations about future inﬂation
and output gap (the control variables of the model), information about these two
variables is used directly to predict their future behaviors. Initial expectation biases
are immediately reduced with no need for the stabilizing properties of interest rate
rules that by responding to actual (or expected) inﬂation and output gap introduce
the positive feedback in the IS curve. Therefore, by announcing its inﬂation and
output gap expectations, the central bank helps agents to learn faster and enlarges
the set of monetary policies associated with stable equilibria under learning.
The publication of interest rate projections is an aspect of monetary policy com-
munication which has recently generated an extensive debate, both among policy
makers and academics. Our analysis provides new results in favor of a prudential
approach in disclosing information about expected interest rates. In fact they im-
ply that when the interest rate rule is not suﬃciently aggressive against inﬂation
the implementation of this communication strategy generates instability. It also
emerges that the larger the weight given by private agents on central bank’s interest
rate projections, the more aggressive has to be the interest rate rule to preserve the
system from instability. In particular it turns out that when such a weight is above
a certain threshold the set of policy rules which generate instability becomes even
larger than the one associated with the no disclosure benchmark.
From a more general point of view it is however useful to observe that our results
are not necessarily against the publication of interest rate projections. In fact, even
when private agents are learning, it cannot be excluded the possibility that the cen-
tral bank, by taking into account the true mechanism used by private agents to form
expectations, might devise interest rate projections which strengthen the stability of
the economy and increase the speed of convergence of private expectations towards
rationality.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we develop the baseline model; in
Section 3 we analyze the eﬀect of publishing the projections about the policy instru-
ment in terms of stability under learning and speed of convergence; in Section 4 we
analyze the alternative scenario where the central bank also publishes its expecta-
tions about the output gap and inﬂation; in Section 5 we consider some extensions.
Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
We assume that under rational expectations the economy evolves according to the
following standard New-Keynesian model:
xt = Etxt+1 − ϕ(it − Etπt+1) + gt (2.1)
πt = αxt + βEtπt+1 + ut, (2.2)Introduction
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2 The model
We assume that under rational expectations the economy evolves according to the
following standard New-Keynesian model:
xt = Etxt+1 − ϕ(it − Etπt+1) + gt (2.1)
πt = αxt + βEtπt+1 + ut, (2.2)
where xt denotes the output gap, πt is inﬂation and it the short-term nominal
interest rate at time t. The operator Et denotes rational expectations conditional
to the information set available at t. Finally, gt and ut are, respectively, a demand
and a cost-push shock. These two shocks evolve according to:
gt = ρggt−1 + εgt and ut = ρuut−1 + εut, (2.3)
where εgt and εut are mutually orthogonal white noises with variances σ2
g, σ2
u.
We supplement equations (2.1)-(2.3) with a standard contemporaneous Taylor
rule.5
it = γ + γxxt + γππt. (2.4)
The stochastic dynamic system (2.1)-(2.4) can be rewritten more compactly as:
yt = Q + F × Etyt+1 + Swt, (2.5)
with














and the link between the parameters in equations (2.1)-(2.4) and matrices Q, F and
S is derived in Appendix 1.
It is well known that under rational expectations, the linear system (2.5) has a
unique non-explosive solution if and only if all eigenvalues of the F matrix are inside
the unit circle.6 As shown in Bullard and Mitra (2002) this condition reduces to
have




When this condition is satisﬁed the unique non-explosive solution is of the min-
imum state variable (MSV) form
yt = A + Bwt (2.7)
5In Section 5 we show that the results of our analysis do not change when the central bank is
assumed to implement monetary policy through a Taylor rule based on forward looking variables.
6See for example McCallum, 2004.
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where A is a (3 × 1) vector and B a (3 × 2) matrix.
We now consider a departure from the hypothesis of rational expectations. In
particular we assume that private agents know the sequence of shocks that hits the
economy (up to the current time t) and the actual values of output gap, inﬂation
and interest rates (up to time t− 1). We also assume that private agents are aware
of the functional form of the MSV solution (2.7), but ignore the value of the A and
B matrices.
Under these hypotheses, the economy evolves according to
yt = Q + F × E
∗
tyt+1 + Swt, (2.8)
wt = Ψwt−1 + εt
where the operator E∗
t denotes expectations conditional to the information set avail-
able at t and the ”∗” symbol is used to stress that expectations are not fully rational.
In particular, we assume that, in each period t, private agents obtain estimates � At
and � Bt of the corresponding matrices of equation (2.7) using a recursive learning
algorithms as in Marcet and Sargent (1989) and Evans and Honkapohja (2001).
These estimates are in turn used to form their own forecasts about the evolution of
the endogenous variables at t + 1, E∗
tyt+1. This procedure is an example of adap-
tive real-time learning, which basic idea is that agents follow a standard statistical
or econometric procedure for estimating the perceived law of motion (PLM) of the
endogenous variables.
Stacking estimates � At and � Bt in a matrix � Γt, and the constant term and the












the matrix � Γt is estimated recursively from past data according to


















t−1 − � Rt−1
�
. (2.10)
According to expressions (2.9)-(2.10), in each period private agents update theirThe model
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According to expressions (2.9)-(2.10), in each period private agents update their
estimates of A and B by a term that depends on the last prediction errors.7 At
the beginning of each period, when the public knows the realization of the shocks











tyt+1 = � At + � BtΨwt. (2.12)
In order to study whether the recursive least-squares estimates � At and � Bt con-
verge to the corresponding matrices which deﬁne the MSV solution under RE we
refer to the concept of expectation stability (E-stability) described in Evans and
Honkapohja (2001).
The E-stability principle focuses on the mapping from the estimated parameters
– the perceived law of motion (2.11) – to the true data generating process – the
actual law of motion, ALM – obtained by inserting expectations (2.12) into the
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yt = Q + F � At +
�
F � BtΨ + S
�
wt. (2.13)
The resulting mapping from the PLM to the ALM is thus given by
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Under some regularity conditions (here satisﬁed)9, the E-stability principle states
that the MSV solution (2.7) is stable under least squares learning if it is locally
asymptotically stable under the ordinary diﬀerential equations (ODE)
∂
∂τ
(A) = TA(A) − A (2.15)
∂
∂τ
(B) = TB(B) − B, (2.16)
where τ denotes “notional” or “artiﬁcial” time and TA(A) = Q+FA and TB(B) =
7Note in particular that � Γt depends on information available up to t − 1.
8We assume that Ψ is known. This assumption is commonly adopted in the learning literature
and does not aﬀect the results (see for example Evans and Honkapohja, 2001).
9See Chapter 6 of Evans and Honkapohja (2001).The model
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and checking whether all their eigenvalues have negative real part. If this condition
is satisﬁed, the economy described by equations (2.8)-(2.10), where agents form
expectations using recursive learning algorithms, converges in the long run to the
one described by equations (2.5) and (2.7), were agents are fully rational.
As shown in Bullard and Mitra (2002) expression (2.6) provides also necessary
and suﬃcient condition for E-stability.
3 Central Bank interest rate path communication
The aim of this section is to analyze the eﬀects of publishing the interest rate path in
terms of E-stability and speed at which agents learn10. While agents’ expectations
evolve according to the learning procedure described in the previous section, we
retain the assumption that the central bank produces its own forecasts assuming that
private agents are perfectly rational. As we said in the introduction this assumption
mostly reﬂects the fact that in practice the central banks that announce their policy
path obtain their projections - to a large extent - from macroeconomic models solved
under the rational expectation hypothesis.
In order to study the eﬀects of the announcement we write the IS and the Phillips
curve T − 1 periods ahead and substitute them in expressions (2.1) and (2.2)11
xt = E
∗
















j (αxt+j + ut+j) (3.2)
It is worth to notice that in order to obtain equations (3.1) and (3.2) we are
using the law of iterated expectations hypothesis, that holds under both RE and
10In terms of determinacy, nothing changes since the model under rational expectations does
not change when the central bank announces its interest rate projections.
11Here, as in Rudebusch and Williams (2006), we substitute separately the T-period ahead IS
and the Phillips curves into the time-t IS and the Phillips curve. Results do not change if we
consider a more general forward representation of this system of equations.Central Bank interest rate path communication
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least square learning (Evans, Honkapohja and Mitra, 2003). This formulation points
out the central role not only of actual real interest rate, but also of expected future
short term real interest rates in determining today output and inﬂation.
3.1 E-Stability of the REE
For simplicity we assume that the central bank announces only the next period















t it+1 − E
∗
tπt+2) + gt + E
∗
tgt+1. (3.4)
Ferrero and Secchi (2009) study the case of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand,
that publishes its own interest rate projections since 1999, and show that market
expectations on short term interest rates respond in a signiﬁcant and consistent way
to the unexpected component of the published path, even though adjustment is not
complete. In order to take into account the possibility that the public moves its
expectations only partially in the direction of the announcement, we assume that
private agents expectations about the expected interest rate depend on both central
bank’s announcement and their own estimates.13 Let 0 ≤ (1 − λ1) ≤ 1 be the weight
that agents assign to the central bank’s announcement,
E
∗
t it+1 = (1 − λ1)E
CB






t it+1 = ai + ρubu,iut + ρgbg,igt (3.6)




t it+1 = ai,t + ρubu,i,tut + ρgbg,i,tgt (3.7)
where ai,t, bu,i,t and bg,i,t are estimated recursively.
12In Section 5 we consider also announcements over longer horizons.
13Alternatively, we may assume that a fraction of private agents in the economy uses its own
learning procedure to form expectations, while the remaining fraction, fully internalizes the central
bank’s announcement. The possibility of having a weight on the released information diﬀerent than
one is particularly relevant when we analyze the case in which the central bank announces both
the policy path and the inﬂation and output gap projections (see Section 4).
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Under these assumptions equations (3.3) and (3.4) can be written as
yt = � Q + � F × E
∗
t yt+1 + � V × E
∗
t yt+2 + � Swt, (3.8)
where � Q, � F, � V and � S are derived in Appendix 2.
Private agents’ forecasts under recursive learning are computed from the esti-
mated PLM
yt = A + Bwt
from which we compute the expectations
Etyt+1 = A + BΨwt and Etyt+2 = A + BΨ
�Ψwt.
The actual law of motion of yt is
yt =
�




� FBΨ + � V BΨ
�Ψ + � S
�
wt, (3.9)
the resulting mapping from the PLM to the ALM is
T(A,B) = (� Q +
�
� F + � V
�
A, � FBΨ + � V BΨ
�Ψ + � S) (3.10)
and the associated ordinary diﬀerential equations used to study E-stability are
∂
∂τ
(A) = � Q +
�
� F + � V
�
A − A, (3.11)
∂
∂τ
(B) = � FBΨ + � V BΨ
�Ψ + � S − B. (3.12)
In the following proposition we state the conditions under which the REE is
E-stable and compare them with those obtained under no announcement.
Proposition 1. Let ϕγx+αϕγπ+1 �= 0. In an economy that (i) evolves according to
the system of equations (3.8), where (ii) at time t the central bank publishes the time
14The case in which the central bank releases also inﬂation and output gap projections is analyzed
in Section 4.
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t+1 interest rate projection consistent with the REE and (iii) private agents assign
weight 0 ≤ (1 − λ1) ≤ 1 to these projections, revealing the interest rate path makes
condition for stability under learning more stringent than under no announcement.









Proof. See Appendix 2.
The Phillips curves (2.2) and (3.2) being equilibrium conditions imply that each
percentage point of permanently higher inﬂation determines a permanently higher
output gap of (1 − β)/α percentage points. Therefore, when the policy maker does
not announce future policy intentions, expression (2.6) states that necessary and
suﬃcient condition for E-stability is that the long-run increase in the nominal in-
terest rate prescribed by policy rules with contemporaneous endogenous variables
should be larger than the permanent increase in the inﬂation rate. Applying a
similar reasoning to the case where the central bank announces the next period ex-
pected interest rate, expression (3.13) states that necessary and suﬃcient condition
for E-stability is that the long-run increase in the nominal interest rate should be
at least 2/(1 + λ1) times as big as the permanent increase in the inﬂation rate. For
0 ≤ (1 − λ1) < 1, this implies a larger response than under no announcement.
In a world where private agents are learning from past data – and along their
learning process they produce biased predictions of the main macro variables – the
result that E-stability conditions are more stringent under the announcement of the
expected interest rate crucially depends on the assumption that the central bank’s
projections are obtained assuming that private agents are perfectly rational – that
is a projection that in the long run, when the agents in the economy have enough
data to estimate correctly the parameters of the model, will be (possibly) correct,
but along the learning process will be inaccurate. As a result, initial expectations
biases tend to be ampliﬁed by the announcement, the overall system becomes more
vulnerable to self-fulﬁlling expectations and in order to stabilize expectations the
long-run increase in the nominal interest rate should be at least 2/(1 + λ1) times as
big as the permanent increase in the inﬂation rate.15
15Based on this argument we can correctly conclude that a central bank that takes into account
the private agents learning process, by announcing the interest rate path consistent with the MSV
solution would help to stabilize expectations. In fact, realizing that agents are learning means
that previous beliefs, Γt−1, are an additional state variable of the system and the MSV solution
would be a function also of it. An interest rate that responds directly to this variable would haveCentral Bank interest rate path communication
WORKING PAPER No. 72 1
3
t+1 interest rate projection consistent with the REE and (iii) private agents assign
weight 0 ≤ (1 − λ1) ≤ 1 to these projections, revealing the interest rate path makes
condition for stability under learning more stringent than under no announcement.









Proof. See Appendix 2.
The Phillips curves (2.2) and (3.2) being equilibrium conditions imply that each
percentage point of permanently higher inﬂation determines a permanently higher
output gap of (1 − β)/α percentage points. Therefore, when the policy maker does
not announce future policy intentions, expression (2.6) states that necessary and
suﬃcient condition for E-stability is that the long-run increase in the nominal in-
terest rate prescribed by policy rules with contemporaneous endogenous variables
should be larger than the permanent increase in the inﬂation rate. Applying a
similar reasoning to the case where the central bank announces the next period ex-
pected interest rate, expression (3.13) states that necessary and suﬃcient condition
for E-stability is that the long-run increase in the nominal interest rate should be
at least 2/(1 + λ1) times as big as the permanent increase in the inﬂation rate. For
0 ≤ (1 − λ1) < 1, this implies a larger response than under no announcement.
In a world where private agents are learning from past data – and along their
learning process they produce biased predictions of the main macro variables – the
result that E-stability conditions are more stringent under the announcement of the
expected interest rate crucially depends on the assumption that the central bank’s
projections are obtained assuming that private agents are perfectly rational – that
is a projection that in the long run, when the agents in the economy have enough
data to estimate correctly the parameters of the model, will be (possibly) correct,
but along the learning process will be inaccurate. As a result, initial expectations
biases tend to be ampliﬁed by the announcement, the overall system becomes more
vulnerable to self-fulﬁlling expectations and in order to stabilize expectations the
long-run increase in the nominal interest rate should be at least 2/(1 + λ1) times as
big as the permanent increase in the inﬂation rate.15
15Based on this argument we can correctly conclude that a central bank that takes into account
the private agents learning process, by announcing the interest rate path consistent with the MSV
solution would help to stabilize expectations. In fact, realizing that agents are learning means
that previous beliefs, Γt−1, are an additional state variable of the system and the MSV solution
would be a function also of it. An interest rate that responds directly to this variable would have
t+1 interest rate projection consistent with the REE and (iii) private agents assign
weight 0 ≤ (1 − λ1) ≤ 1 to these projections, revealing the interest rate path makes
condition for stability under learning more stringent than under no announcement.









Proof. See Appendix 2.
The Phillips curves (2.2) and (3.2) being equilibrium conditions imply that each
percentage point of permanently higher inﬂation determines a permanently higher
output gap of (1 − β)/α percentage points. Therefore, when the policy maker does
not announce future policy intentions, expression (2.6) states that necessary and
suﬃcient condition for E-stability is that the long-run increase in the nominal in-
terest rate prescribed by policy rules with contemporaneous endogenous variables
should be larger than the permanent increase in the inﬂation rate. Applying a
similar reasoning to the case where the central bank announces the next period ex-
pected interest rate, expression (3.13) states that necessary and suﬃcient condition
for E-stability is that the long-run increase in the nominal interest rate should be
at least 2/(1 + λ1) times as big as the permanent increase in the inﬂation rate. For
0 ≤ (1 − λ1) < 1, this implies a larger response than under no announcement.
In a world where private agents are learning from past data – and along their
learning process they produce biased predictions of the main macro variables – the
result that E-stability conditions are more stringent under the announcement of the
expected interest rate crucially depends on the assumption that the central bank’s
projections are obtained assuming that private agents are perfectly rational – that
is a projection that in the long run, when the agents in the economy have enough
data to estimate correctly the parameters of the model, will be (possibly) correct,
but along the learning process will be inaccurate. As a result, initial expectations
biases tend to be ampliﬁed by the announcement, the overall system becomes more
vulnerable to self-fulﬁlling expectations and in order to stabilize expectations the
long-run increase in the nominal interest rate should be at least 2/(1 + λ1) times as
big as the permanent increase in the inﬂation rate.15
15Based on this argument we can correctly conclude that a central bank that takes into account
the private agents learning process, by announcing the interest rate path consistent with the MSV
solution would help to stabilize expectations. In fact, realizing that agents are learning means
that previous beliefs, Γt−1, are an additional state variable of the system and the MSV solution
would be a function also of it. An interest rate that responds directly to this variable would have
Let’s consider an example where private agents have an initial positive bias in
expected inﬂation. This positive bias will lead to higher inﬂation both directly
through the Phillips curve and indirectly through the real interest rate that aﬀects
the output gap in the IS curve and therefore inﬂation (in the Phillips curve). A
policy rule that reacts directly to inﬂation (and output gap) introduces a feedback
element in the IS curve that helps to oﬀset the initial bias – if the response to
inﬂation is suﬃciently large, as stated in condition (2.6). By publishing the interest
rate projections obtained under the (incorrect) assumption that private agents are
rational, the central bank is not taking into account the systematic mistakes that
private agents are doing along the learning process and, therefore, reduces its ability
to contrast the cumulative movement away from REE through the interest rate rule
– or in other terms it weakens the positive feedback element in the IS curve.
Figure 1: E-stability under no announcement, (1 − λ1) = 0, and under a fully
internalized announcement of the interest rate path, (1 − λ1) = 1.
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Figure 1 compares the regions of E-stability in the (γx,γπ) space under no an-
nouncement and under announcement of the interest rate path. The lower region
shows the set of policies that implies instability under learning when the central
bank is silent about the interest rate path, (1 − λ1) = 0. Publishing the path, the
central bank enlarges the region of instability – the larger the weight the agents
give to the announcement, the larger the region of instability under learning. In
particular, when the weight that private agents give to the projection is larger than
0.65, the classical Taylor rule with γx = 0.5 and γπ = 1.5 would fall in the region of
instability under learning.
3.2 Speed of convergence
In the previous sections we have analyzed the eﬀect of announcing the interest rate
path on the long-run properties of the equilibrium under learning. Combinations
of (γx,γπ) that imply a determinate and E-stable REE are usually deﬁned in the
literature as ”good” policies (Bullard and Mitra, 2002). The concept of speed of
convergence can be used in order to reﬁne further the set of these policies (see Fer-
rero, 2007). If convergence is rapid, we may think to focus on asymptotic behaviors,
because the economy would typically be close to the REE. In this case the publi-
cation of projections obtained under the assumption of fully rational private agents
would have a minor eﬀect on the stability of the economy. Conversely, if convergence
is slow, the economy would be far from the REE for a long period of time and its
behavior would be dominated by the transitional dynamics. In this case the con-
sequences associated to the incorrect assumption that private agents are perfectly
rational may result signiﬁcantly more severe.
In the literature, the speed of convergence of recursive least square learning algo-
rithms in stochastic models has been analyzed mainly through numerical procedures
and simulations. The few analytical results on the transition to the rational expec-
tations equilibrium environment are obtained by using a theorem of Benveniste,
Metiver and Priouret (1990) that relates the speed of convergence of the learning
process to the derivative of the associated ODE at the ﬁxed point. In the present
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the set of policies – combinations of γπ and γx – under which all the eigenvalues of
the � F + � V matrix have real part smaller than 0.5.
The following proposition, adapting arguments from Marcet and Sargent (1995),
shows that by choosing the γπ and γx, the policy-maker not only determines the
level of inﬂation and output gap and their stability in the long run, but also the
speed at which the economy converges to the REE, i.e. the speed at which agents
learn.
Proposition 2. In an economy that (i) evolves according to the system of equations
(3.8), where (ii) private agents assign weight 0 ≤ (1 − λ1) ≤ 1 to the central bank’s
announcement, and (iii) the central bank chooses a policy (γπ,γx) ∈ S1, then
√
t(Γt − Γ)
D → N (0,ΩΓ)



















Proof. see Appendix 3.
If the conditions of Proposition 2 are satisﬁed, the estimated Γt converges to
the REE, Γ, at root-t speed. Root-t is the speed at which, in classical econometrics,
the least square estimator converges to the true value of the parameters estimated.
Note that the formula for the variance of the estimator Γt is modiﬁed with respect
to the classical case. In particular, if (γπ,γx) ∈ S1, the higher the eigenvalues of
� F + � V , the larger the asymptotic variance of the limiting distribution (Marcet and
Sargent, 1995). In this case, convergence is slower in the sense that the probability
that a shock will drive the estimates far away from the REE is higher and the period
of time that agents need in order to learn it back is larger (see Ferrero, 2007).
Proposition 3. In an economy that (i) evolves according to the system of equations
(3.8), where (ii) private agents assign weight 0 ≤ (1 − λ1) ≤ 1 to the central bank’s
announcement, and (iii) the central bank chooses a policy (γπ,γx) ∈ S1, revealing
the path makes condition for root-t convergence more stringent than under no an-
nouncement. In particular, the smaller the weight to the announcement, the larger
the set of policies under which private agents learn at root-t speed.
Proof. see Appendix 4.Central Bank interest rate path communication
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In Figure 2 we focus on the two extreme cases where there is no announce-
ment, (1 − λ1) = 0, and where private agents fully internalize the announcement,
(1 − λ1) = 1. Figure 2 shows that (i) the set of combinations (γx,γπ) resulting in
root-t convergence is much smaller than the one under which E-stability holds and
(ii) the region of ”fast” convergence (i.e. root-t convergence) is smaller when the
central banks announces its policy (the smallest region in the upper-left corner) than
under no announcement (the sum of the two upper-left corner regions).
Figure 2: E-stability & root-t convergence under no announcement and under fully
internalized announcement of expected interest rates
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the set of policies under which all the eigenvalues of � F + � V have real part less than
one but not all have real part less than 0.5.
Although Propositions 2 and 3 do not apply when (γπ,γx) ∈ S2, it can be shown
by Monte Carlo calculations that under those policies the eﬀects of initial conditions
fail to die out at an exponential rate (as it is needed for root-t convergence) and
agents’ beliefs converge to rational expectations at a rate slower than root-t. In
particular, also when (γπ,γx) ∈ S2, the link between the derivative of the ODE and
the speed of convergence holds.
Marcet and Sargent (1995) suggest a numerical procedure to obtain an estimate
of the rate of convergence when (γπ,γx) ∈ S2. In this case it is possible to deﬁne
the rate of convergence, δ, for which
t
δ (Γt − Γ)
D → F (3.15)
for some non-degenerate well-deﬁned distribution F with mean zero and variance
ΩF.
Expression (3.15) can be used to obtain an approximation of the rate of con-
vergence16 for large t. Since E
�
tδ (Γt − Γ)(Γt − Γ)
��









2δ (Γtz − Γ)(Γtz − Γ)
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(Γtz − Γ)(Γtz − Γ)
��.
The expectations can be approximated by simulating a large number of indepen-
dent realizations of length t and tz, and calculating the mean square distance from
Γ across realizations for each coeﬃcient. Table 1 reports the rate of convergence,
δ, the real part of the largest eigenvalue of the
�
� F + � V
�
matrix, k, the number of
quarters needed in order to halve the initial expectation error, T1/2, and the number
of quarters needed in order to reduce to one third the initial error, T1/3, for diﬀerent
values of (γπ,γx) ∈ S2
17.
Calculations show that (i) for a given response to inﬂation, γπ, the larger the
response to output gap, γx, the higher the real part of the larger eigenvalue, the
smaller δ and the lower the speed of convergence; (ii) the opposite relation holds for
16The calculation of the rate of convergence is based on the assumption that such a δ exists.
17Simulations are obtained under Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gertler (CGG, 2000) calibration: US data,
ϕ = 4, α = 0.075, β = 0.99; We use quarterly interest rates and we measure inﬂation as quarterly
changes in the log of prices. Therefore our CGG calibration divides by 4 the α and multiplies by
4 the ϕ reported by CGG (see also Honkapohja and Mitra, 2004).
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Table 1: Speed of convergence and simulations
γπ = 1.5 γπ = 2.5 γπ = 3.5
λ = 1 λ = 0 λ = 1 λ = 0 λ = 1 λ = 0
γx = 0.25 k 0.76 >1 0.19 0.86 0.07 0.62
δ 0.24 N.A. 0.5 0.14 0.5 0.37
T1/2 72 N.A. 11 >400 7 20
T1/3 >400 N.A. 23 >400 12 66
γx = 0.5 k 0.85 >1 0.63 0.90 0.42 0.73
δ 0.14 N.A. 0.36 0.10 0.5 0.26
T1/2 >400 N.A. 21 >400 10 40
T1/3 >400 N.A. 67 >400 24 195
γx = 1 k 0.91 >1 0.79 0.92 0.67 0.82
δ 0.08 N.A. 0.21 0.07 0.32 0.17
T1/2 >400 N.A. 78 >400 24 147
T1/3 >400 N.A. >400 >400 89 >400
NOTE: Initial expectation error is 10 per cent of the REE. In all
simulations we compute the rate of convergence, δ, with 1000 in-
dependent realizations for t=9000 and tz=10000 periods; k is the
real part of the largest eigenvalue of the F +V matrix; T1/2 indi-
cates the quarters needed in order to reduce the inﬂation forecast
error to one half of the initial bias; T1/3 indicates the quarters
needed in order to reduce the inﬂation forecast error to one third
of the initial bias.
the response to inﬂation: for a given response to output gap, γx, the larger γπ, the
higher the speed of convergence; (iii) for a given (γπ,γx) policy, the announcement
of the interest rate path has a large impact on the speed of convergence. For the
Taylor rule’s parameter (γπ = 1.5,γx = 0.5), under no announcement we need
more than 100 years in order to halve the initial expectation error, while when
the announcement is fully internalized agents never learn. A stronger response to
inﬂation speeds up the learning process, but diﬀerences between announcing or not
the interest rate path remain substantial: under no announcement, for γπ = 3.5 and
γx = 0.5, the initial error is halved in about 2.5 years, but still we need about 10
years under announcement.
In order to formally map elements of the set of policy rules into a measure of the
speed of convergence we deﬁne the speed of convergence isoquants.18
Deﬁnition 1. A speed of convergence isoquant-k is a curve in R2 along which all
points – combinations (γπ,γx) – imply that the largest eigenvalue of � F + � V has real
18In the deﬁnition we tie up speed of convergence with the eigenvalues of the matrix � F + � V .
In general, the speed of convergence depends on the eigenvalues of the derivatives of the mapping
from PLM to ALM, T(A). In this case, the derivative is equal to � F + � V (see Ferrero, 2003).Central Bank interest rate path communication
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Table 1: Speed of convergence and simulations
γπ = 1.5 γπ = 2.5 γπ = 3.5
λ = 1 λ = 0 λ = 1 λ = 0 λ = 1 λ = 0
γx = 0.25 k 0.76 >1 0.19 0.86 0.07 0.62
δ 0.24 N.A. 0.5 0.14 0.5 0.37
T1/2 72 N.A. 11 >400 7 20
T1/3 >400 N.A. 23 >400 12 66
γx = 0.5 k 0.85 >1 0.63 0.90 0.42 0.73
δ 0.14 N.A. 0.36 0.10 0.5 0.26
T1/2 >400 N.A. 21 >400 10 40
T1/3 >400 N.A. 67 >400 24 195
γx = 1 k 0.91 >1 0.79 0.92 0.67 0.82
δ 0.08 N.A. 0.21 0.07 0.32 0.17
T1/2 >400 N.A. 78 >400 24 147
T1/3 >400 N.A. >400 >400 89 >400
NOTE: Initial expectation error is 10 per cent of the REE. In all
simulations we compute the rate of convergence, δ, with 1000 in-
dependent realizations for t=9000 and tz=10000 periods; k is the
real part of the largest eigenvalue of the F +V matrix; T1/2 indi-
cates the quarters needed in order to reduce the inﬂation forecast
error to one half of the initial bias; T1/3 indicates the quarters
needed in order to reduce the inﬂation forecast error to one third
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Figure 3: The speed of learning isoquants for λ1 = 0 (dotted line) and λ1 = 1
(continue line)

























Figure 3 shows the map of the speed of convergence isoquants in the two extreme
cases where there is no announcement, (1 − λ1) = 0, and where the agents fully
internalize the announcement, (1 − λ1) = 1. We observe that, for a given λ1, the
lower the isoquant, the slower the convergence. In fact, from Marcet and Sargent
(1995), the larger the real part of the largest eigenvalue of � F + � V , the slower the
convergence and the lower the isoquant. Moreover, for a given policy, the speed at
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Figure 3 shows the map of the speed of convergence isoquants in the two extreme
cases where there is no announcement, (1 − λ1) = 0, and where the agents fully
internalize the announcement, (1 − λ1) = 1. We observe that, for a given λ1, the
lower the isoquant, the slower the convergence. In fact, from Marcet and Sargent
(1995), the larger the real part of the largest eigenvalue of � F + � V , the slower the
convergence and the lower the isoquant. Moreover, for a given policy, the speed at
which agents learn is lower if the central banks announces its policy path.
For example, consider the point (γπ,γx) = (1.5,0.5) in the isoquant map. Being
this point below the k = 1 isoquant in the mapping obtained under announcement
(dotted lines), private agents never learn. Under no announcement they learn, but
very slowly, as the (γπ,γx) = (1.5,0.5) point is close to the 0.8 isoquant in the
continuous-line mapping. Increasing γπ to 2.5 we reach the E-stable region under
announcement, but learning is very slow (the point (γπ,γx) = (2.5,0.5) is between
the 0.8 and the 0.9 isoquant in the dotted mapping); under no announcement con-
vergence is much faster, close to root-t (the 0.5 isoquant in the continuous-line
mapping).
The next proposition formalizes these results.
Proposition 4. In an economy that (i) evolves according to the system of equations
(3.8), where (ii) private agents assign weight 0 ≤ (1 − λ1) ≤ 1 to the central bank’s
announcement, and (iii) the central bank chooses a policy (γπ,γx) ∈ S2, for a given
γx, the smaller the weight to the policy path projections, the smaller has to be γπ
in order to reach the same speed of convergence. Or in other terms, for a given
combination of (γx,γπ), the smaller the weight that private agents assign to the
policy path projections, the faster the learning process.
Proof. see Appendix 5.
4 Announcing expected inﬂation and output gap
In the previous sections we have shown that in a world where private agents are
learning from past data – along their learning process they produce biased predic-
tions of the main macro variables – a central bank that publishes its projection
obtained under the incorrect assumption that private agents are perfectly rational
reduces the speed at which agents learn19.
In this section we analyze the implications in terms of E-stability and speed of
convergence when the central bank announces its projections about inﬂation and
output gap, possibly in addition to the interest rate path. We assume that also




t yt+1 = A + BΨwt.
19Here we are not analyzing the important implications in terms of welfare. In particular we are
not saying that a slower convergence will necessarily imply a lower social welfare. For an analysis
of speed of convergence and welfare in a New-Keynesian model see Ferrero 2007.Central Bank interest rate path communication
N a t i o n a l   B a n k   o f   P o l a n d 2
3
part equal to k. In an economy that evolves according to the system of equations













Figure 3: The speed of learning isoquants for λ1 = 0 (dotted line) and λ1 = 1
(continue line)

























Figure 3 shows the map of the speed of convergence isoquants in the two extreme
cases where there is no announcement, (1 − λ1) = 0, and where the agents fully
internalize the announcement, (1 − λ1) = 1. We observe that, for a given λ1, the
lower the isoquant, the slower the convergence. In fact, from Marcet and Sargent
(1995), the larger the real part of the largest eigenvalue of � F + � V , the slower the
convergence and the lower the isoquant. Moreover, for a given policy, the speed at
which agents learn is lower if the central banks announces its policy path.
For example, consider the point (γπ,γx) = (1.5,0.5) in the isoquant map. Being
this point below the k = 1 isoquant in the mapping obtained under announcement
(dotted lines), private agents never learn. Under no announcement they learn, but
very slowly, as the (γπ,γx) = (1.5,0.5) point is close to the 0.8 isoquant in the
continuous-line mapping. Increasing γπ to 2.5 we reach the E-stable region under
announcement, but learning is very slow (the point (γπ,γx) = (2.5,0.5) is between
the 0.8 and the 0.9 isoquant in the dotted mapping); under no announcement con-
vergence is much faster, close to root-t (the 0.5 isoquant in the continuous-line
mapping).
The next proposition formalizes these results.
Proposition 4. In an economy that (i) evolves according to the system of equations
(3.8), where (ii) private agents assign weight 0 ≤ (1 − λ1) ≤ 1 to the central bank’s
announcement, and (iii) the central bank chooses a policy (γπ,γx) ∈ S2, for a given
γx, the smaller the weight to the policy path projections, the smaller has to be γπ
in order to reach the same speed of convergence. Or in other terms, for a given
combination of (γx,γπ), the smaller the weight that private agents assign to the
policy path projections, the faster the learning process.
Proof. see Appendix 5.
4 Announcing expected inﬂation and output gap
In the previous sections we have shown that in a world where private agents are
learning from past data – along their learning process they produce biased predic-
tions of the main macro variables – a central bank that publishes its projection
obtained under the incorrect assumption that private agents are perfectly rational
reduces the speed at which agents learn19.
In this section we analyze the implications in terms of E-stability and speed of
convergence when the central bank announces its projections about inﬂation and
output gap, possibly in addition to the interest rate path. We assume that also




t yt+1 = A + BΨwt.
19Here we are not analyzing the important implications in terms of welfare. In particular we are
not saying that a slower convergence will necessarily imply a lower social welfare. For an analysis
of speed of convergence and welfare in a New-Keynesian model see Ferrero 2007.Announcing expected inflation and output gap
WORKING PAPER No. 72 2
4
which agents learn is lower if the central banks announces its policy path.
For example, consider the point (γπ,γx) = (1.5,0.5) in the isoquant map. Being
this point below the k = 1 isoquant in the mapping obtained under announcement
(dotted lines), private agents never learn. Under no announcement they learn, but
very slowly, as the (γπ,γx) = (1.5,0.5) point is close to the 0.8 isoquant in the
continuous-line mapping. Increasing γπ to 2.5 we reach the E-stable region under
announcement, but learning is very slow (the point (γπ,γx) = (2.5,0.5) is between
the 0.8 and the 0.9 isoquant in the dotted mapping); under no announcement con-
vergence is much faster, close to root-t (the 0.5 isoquant in the continuous-line
mapping).
The next proposition formalizes these results.
Proposition 4. In an economy that (i) evolves according to the system of equations
(3.8), where (ii) private agents assign weight 0 ≤ (1 − λ1) ≤ 1 to the central bank’s
announcement, and (iii) the central bank chooses a policy (γπ,γx) ∈ S2, for a given
γx, the smaller the weight to the policy path projections, the smaller has to be γπ
in order to reach the same speed of convergence. Or in other terms, for a given
combination of (γx,γπ), the smaller the weight that private agents assign to the
policy path projections, the faster the learning process.
Proof. see Appendix 5.
4 Announcing expected inﬂation and output gap
In the previous sections we have shown that in a world where private agents are
learning from past data – along their learning process they produce biased predic-
tions of the main macro variables – a central bank that publishes its projection
obtained under the incorrect assumption that private agents are perfectly rational
reduces the speed at which agents learn19.
In this section we analyze the implications in terms of E-stability and speed of
convergence when the central bank announces its projections about inﬂation and
output gap, possibly in addition to the interest rate path. We assume that also




t yt+1 = A + BΨwt.
19Here we are not analyzing the important implications in terms of welfare. In particular we are
not saying that a slower convergence will necessarily imply a lower social welfare. For an analysis
of speed of convergence and welfare in a New-Keynesian model see Ferrero 2007.
which agents learn is lower if the central banks announces its policy path.
For example, consider the point (γπ,γx) = (1.5,0.5) in the isoquant map. Being
this point below the k = 1 isoquant in the mapping obtained under announcement
(dotted lines), private agents never learn. Under no announcement they learn, but
very slowly, as the (γπ,γx) = (1.5,0.5) point is close to the 0.8 isoquant in the
continuous-line mapping. Increasing γπ to 2.5 we reach the E-stable region under
announcement, but learning is very slow (the point (γπ,γx) = (2.5,0.5) is between
the 0.8 and the 0.9 isoquant in the dotted mapping); under no announcement con-
vergence is much faster, close to root-t (the 0.5 isoquant in the continuous-line
mapping).
The next proposition formalizes these results.
Proposition 4. In an economy that (i) evolves according to the system of equations
(3.8), where (ii) private agents assign weight 0 ≤ (1 − λ1) ≤ 1 to the central bank’s
announcement, and (iii) the central bank chooses a policy (γπ,γx) ∈ S2, for a given
γx, the smaller the weight to the policy path projections, the smaller has to be γπ
in order to reach the same speed of convergence. Or in other terms, for a given
combination of (γx,γπ), the smaller the weight that private agents assign to the
policy path projections, the faster the learning process.
Proof. see Appendix 5.
4 Announcing expected inﬂation and output gap
In the previous sections we have shown that in a world where private agents are
learning from past data – along their learning process they produce biased predic-
tions of the main macro variables – a central bank that publishes its projection
obtained under the incorrect assumption that private agents are perfectly rational
reduces the speed at which agents learn19.
In this section we analyze the implications in terms of E-stability and speed of
convergence when the central bank announces its projections about inﬂation and
output gap, possibly in addition to the interest rate path. We assume that also




t yt+1 = A + BΨwt.
19Here we are not analyzing the important implications in terms of welfare. In particular we are
not saying that a slower convergence will necessarily imply a lower social welfare. For an analysis
of speed of convergence and welfare in a New-Keynesian model see Ferrero 2007.
The main diﬀerence between the announcement of the policy path and the an-
nouncement of inﬂation and output gap paths is that, while the interest rate (the
instrument variable of the model) is implicitly used by private agents in order to
form expectations about future inﬂation and output gap (the control variables of
the model), information about output gap and inﬂation are used directly to predict
those variables. Initial expectation biases are immediately reduced with no need for
the stabilizing properties of interest rate rules that respond to actual (or expected)
inﬂation and output gap. Therefore, by announcing its inﬂation and output gap
expectations, the central bank helps agents to learn faster and enlarges the set of
monetary policies associated with stable equilibria under learning.
Let 0 ≤ (1 − λ2) ≤ 1 be the weight that private agents give to the central bank’s
announcement of inﬂation and output gap
E
P
t πt+1 = (1 − λ2)E
CB





t xt+1 = (1 − λ2)E
CB
t πt+1 + λ2E
∗
txt+1.
Under learning the economy evolves according to the system of equation
yt = � � Q + � � F × E
∗
t yt+1 + � � V × E
∗
t yt+2 + � � Swt. (4.1)
where matrices � � Q, � � F, � � V and � � S are derived in Appendix 7.
4.1 Announcing only expected inﬂation and output gap
First we focus on the case in which the central bank only announces the inﬂation
and output gap projections and private agents partly internalize this announcement
to form their expectations, i.e. λ1 = 1 and 0 < (1 − λ2) ≤ 1.20
Proposition 5. In an economy that (i) evolves according to the system of equa-
tion (4.1), where (ii) the central bank publishes only the projection about inﬂa-
tion and output gap consistent with the REE and (iii) private agents assign weight
0 < (1 − λ2) ≤ 1 to those projections, revealing the path makes condition for sta-
bility under learning less stringent and the region of root-t convergence larger than
under no announcement. In particular, the necessary and suﬃcient condition for
20Again, we may assume that a fraction of private agents in the economy uses its own learning
procedure to form expectations, while the remaining fraction fully internalizes the central bank’s
announcement.Announcing expected inflation and output gap
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E-stability of the REE is
γπ >
2λ2 (βλ2 + 1)αϕ − (β2λ2 − 1)(λ2 − 1)





Proof. See Appendix 7.
Announcing inﬂation and output gap projections has opposite implications with
respect to publish the interest rate path. The former enlarges the region of policies
that imply an E-stable equilibrium and root-t convergence, while the latter enlarges
the region of instability and slow convergence.
Figure 4 shows the region of E-stability and root-t convergence when the central
bank announces only the inﬂation and output gap and the private sector gives weight
0.25 to this announcement. It is suﬃcient that private agents give a little weight to
inﬂation and output gap projections in order to shrink substantially the region of
instability under learning and to increase the speed of convergence.
4.2 Announcing expected interest rate, inﬂation and output
gap
In practice, all central banks that publish their own interest rate projections were
previously publishing their inﬂation and output gap expectations. Therefore, we
also focus on the case where the central bank announces both the interest rate path
and the inﬂation and output gap projections and the private agents at least partially
internalize these announcements to form their expectations.21
Clearly the two types of announcement have opposite eﬀects in the dynamics of
the economy.
In Table 2 we report for diﬀerent combinations of λ1 and λ2, the speed of conver-
gence and the number of periods needed in order to reduce to 1/3 the initial forecast
error, when the central bank sets the interest rate according to a Taylor rule with
coeﬃcients (γπ,γx) = (1.5,0.5). We observe that (i) for a given λ2, the larger the
weight to the interest rate announcement (lower λ1), the slower the convergence;
21By allowing for a λ1 �= λ2 we are able to analyze the case in which diﬀerent typology of agents
in the economy pay diﬀerent attention to the announcements. For example market operators may
pay more attention to interest rate announcements, while workers to inﬂation expectations. We are
also able to study the case in which the communication strategy of the central bank focuses more
on a particular macroeconomic variable, depending on the speciﬁc macroeconomic environment in
which it operates.
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0.25 to this announcement. It is suﬃcient that private agents give a little weight to
inﬂation and output gap projections in order to shrink substantially the region of
instability under learning and to increase the speed of convergence.
4.2 Announcing expected interest rate, inﬂation and output
gap
In practice, all central banks that publish their own interest rate projections were
previously publishing their inﬂation and output gap expectations. Therefore, we
also focus on the case where the central bank announces both the interest rate path
and the inﬂation and output gap projections and the private agents at least partially
internalize these announcements to form their expectations.21
Clearly the two types of announcement have opposite eﬀects in the dynamics of
the economy.
In Table 2 we report for diﬀerent combinations of λ1 and λ2, the speed of conver-
gence and the number of periods needed in order to reduce to 1/3 the initial forecast
error, when the central bank sets the interest rate according to a Taylor rule with
coeﬃcients (γπ,γx) = (1.5,0.5). We observe that (i) for a given λ2, the larger the
weight to the interest rate announcement (lower λ1), the slower the convergence;
21By allowing for a λ1 �= λ2 we are able to analyze the case in which diﬀerent typology of agents
in the economy pay diﬀerent attention to the announcements. For example market operators may
pay more attention to interest rate announcements, while workers to inﬂation expectations. We are
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on a particular macroeconomic variable, depending on the speciﬁc macroeconomic environment in
which it operates.
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Under learning the economy evolves according to the system of equation
yt = � � Q + � � F × E
∗
t yt+1 + � � V × E
∗
t yt+2 + � � Swt. (4.1)
where matrices � � Q, � � F, � � V and � � S are derived in Appendix 7.
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announcement.
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moreover, (ii) it is suﬃcient a low weight to the announcement of inﬂation and out-
put gap in order to increase signiﬁcantly the speed of convergence; ﬁnally (iii) for
suﬃciently low λ1 and high λ2 the negative eﬀects of the interest rate path dominate
the positive eﬀects of the inﬂation and output announcement. Proposition 6 states
formally this last result.22
22In any case also when the positive eﬀect of the inﬂation and output gap announcement domi-
nates, the publication of the interest rate path worsen the properties of the equilibrium in terms of
stability and speed of convergence with respect to the case in which the central bank is silent about
its own interest rate projections obtained under the erroneous assumption that private agents are
perfectly rational.Announcing expected inflation and output gap
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Table 2: Speed of convergence and simulations
λ2 = 0.5 λ2 = 0.6 λ2 = 0.7 λ2 = 0.8 λ2 = 0.9 λ2 = 1.0
λ1 = 0.0 δ 0.46 0.35 0.24 0.13 0.02 N.A.
T1/3 13 28 110 >400 >400 N.A.
λ1 = 0.1 δ 0.49 0.38 0.27 0.16 0.06 N.A.
T1/3 12 24 75 >400 >400 N.A.
λ1 = 0.2 δ 0.50 0.41 0.30 0.19 0.09 N.A.
T1/3 12 21 57 >400 >400 N.A.
λ1 = 0.3 δ 0.50 0.43 0.32 0.22 0.11 0.00
T1/3 11 19 46 255 >400 >400
λ1 = 0.4 δ 0.50 0.45 0.34 0.24 0.13 0.03
T1/3 10 17 38 167 >400 >400
λ1 = 0.5 δ 0.50 0.47 0.36 0.26 0.16 0.05
T1/3 10 16 33 121 >400 >400
λ1 = 0.6 δ 0.50 0.48 0.38 0.28 0.18 0.07
T1/3 9 15 30 94 >400 >400
λ1 = 0.7 δ 0.50 0.49 0.40 0.29 0.20 0.09
T1/3 9 14 27 76 >400 >400
λ1 = 0.8 δ 0.50 0.50 0.41 0.31 0.21 0.10
T1/3 9 13 24 64 >400 >400
λ1 = 0.9 δ 0.50 0.50 0.42 0.32 0.22 0.12
T1/3 9 13 23 55 287 >400
λ1 = 1.0 δ 0.50 0.50 0.43 0.33 0.24 0.14
T1/3 8 12 21 49 218 >400
NOTE: Initial expectation error is 10 per cent of the REE. In
all simulations we compute the rate of convergence, δ, with 1000
independent realizations for t=9000 and tz=10000 periods; T1/3
indicates number of quarters needed in order to reduce the inﬂa-
tion forecast error to one third of the initial bias. Interest rate
rule coeﬃcients are (γπ,γx) = (1.5,0.5).
Proposition 6. In an economy that (i) evolves according to the system of equation
(4.1), where (ii) the central bank publishes both the interest rate path and the inﬂation
and output gap projections consistent with the REE and (iii) private agents give
weight 0 < (1 − λ1) ≤ 1 to the former and 0 < (1 − λ2) ≤ 1 to the latter, in order
to have condition for E-stability less stringent under no announcement than under
announcement, the necessary condition is that
0 ≤ λ1 < 2 −






Proof. See appendix 8.
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Proposition 6. In an economy that (i) evolves according to the system of equation
(4.1), where (ii) the central bank publishes both the interest rate path and the inﬂation
and output gap projections consistent with the REE and (iii) private agents give
weight 0 < (1 − λ1) ≤ 1 to the former and 0 < (1 − λ2) ≤ 1 to the latter, in order
to have condition for E-stability less stringent under no announcement than under
announcement, the necessary condition is that
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Proof. See appendix 8.
In Figure 5, region A shows the combination of weights to the two projections
under which the announcement of the paths reduces the region of stability under
learning. In particular when private agents give relatively high weights to the interest
rate path and low weights to the inﬂation and output gap projections, transparency
increases the region of instability under learning.
Figure 5: Weights to the projections and E-stability when the central bank an-
nounces interest rate, inﬂation and output gap paths
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In this section we focus on some extensions of the baseline model. In particular
we analyze how our main results are aﬀected by: (i) the announcement of a longer
interest rate path, (ii) a policy rule that responds to expected inﬂation and output
gap and (iii) the announcement also includes a subjective judgmental component.
5.1 Publication of a longer path
One interesting extension considers the case where the central bank announces a
longer path. The following proposition states that the longer the horizon T of the
announced path, the larger the region of instability.Extensions
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we analyze how our main results are aﬀected by: (i) the announcement of a longer
interest rate path, (ii) a policy rule that responds to expected inﬂation and output
gap and (iii) the announcement also includes a subjective judgmental component.
5.1 Publication of a longer path
One interesting extension considers the case where the central bank announces a
longer path. The following proposition states that the longer the horizon T of the
announced path, the larger the region of instability.
Proposition 7. In an economy that (i) evolves according to equations (3.8), where
(ii) private agents assign weight 0 ≤ (1 − λ1) ≤ 1 to the central bank’s announce-
ment, the longer is the path revealed the more stringent are conditions for E-stability.
In particular, the necessary and suﬃcient condition for the MSV solution to be E-
stable when the central bank announces the T-period path is
γπ >
T





Proof. See Appendix 9.
Figure 6: E-stability and the announcement of a T-period interest rate path
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Figure 7 reports for diﬀerent Ts the regions where the REE is E-stable and shows
that for T suﬃciently large, no realistic policy will be able to drive the economy back
to the REE.
5.2 Forward expectations in the policy rule
We consider now an expectation-based policy rule:
it = γ + γxE
∗
t xt+1 + γπE
∗
tπt+1 (5.3)
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∗
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∗
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so that it is set by the monetary authority in response to forecast of next period
inﬂation and output gap.
As shown in Bullard and Mitra necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the REE
to be E-stable is




Proposition 8 shows that under expectation-based policy rules conditions for E-
stability when the central bank announces the interest rate path are the same of
those obtained under contemporaneous policy rules. In particular, also under the
hypothesis that the central bank follows an expectations-based policy rule, revealing
the path makes conditions for E-stability more stringent than under no announce-
ment.
Proposition 8. Let ϕγx + αϕγπ + 1 �= 0. In an economy where (i) the central
bank follows an expectations-based policy rule (5.3), (ii) at time t the central bank
publishes the time t+1 interest rate projection consistent with the REE and (iii)
private agents give weight 0 ≤ (1 − λ1) ≤ 1 to these projections, revealing the path
makes condition for E-stability more stringent than under no announcement. In
particular, the necessary and suﬃcient condition for stability under learning (E-








Proof. See appendix 10.
5.3 Announced path with a subjective judgmental compo-
nent
In the previous sections we have assumed that central banks projections are model
consistent and derived under the assumption of rational expectations. Here we
investigate the eﬀect of introducing a subjective and judgemental component in the
projection. We model this component by introducing a shock in the policy path,23
E
CB
t it+1 = ai + ρubu,iut + ρgbg,igt + zt (5.8)
23This is only one way to introduce the judgmental component. A more general analysis is left
for future research.Extensions
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with
zt = ρzzt−1 + εzt (5.9)
where εzt is white noises with variances σ2
z. Under this assumption the only elements
that change in the system of equations describing the evolution of the economy
yt = � Q + � F × E
∗
t yt+1 + � V × E
∗
t yt+2 + � Swt, (5.10)
are the matrix � S and the vector of exogenous state variables wt, that now includes








As the matrices � F and � V are not aﬀected by the introduction of the additional
term in the announced path, all the results in terms of E-stability and speed of con-
vergence obtained in the previous sections hold also when we introduce a judgmental
component modeled as an exogenous shock in the projections.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have studied a standard New-Keynesian economy where private
agents are learning, the central bank implements monetary policy through an interest
rate rule and it publishes its macroeconomic projections. To stay close to the current
practice of most of the central banks which follow this communication strategy we
have assumed that projections are obtained under the assumption that the economy
is populated by perfectly rational agents.
Our analysis has focused on the eﬀects of such a publication on the stability of
the equilibrium and on the speed of convergence of private expectations towards ra-
tionality. The main result is that the eﬀect depends on the economic variable which
is published. In particular when the central bank reveals information about its own
expected interest path, conditions for stability under learning become more strin-
gent and the speed of convergence slows down. In such a situation macroeconomic
stability and a faster process of convergence of expectations toward rationality can
be restored only if the central bank selects an interest rule that responds more ag-
gressively against inﬂation. On the contrary, the announcement of expected inﬂation
and output gap enlarges the set of policy rules which are consistent with stability
and a fast process of convergence.
Our analysis suggests that a central bank, before deciding to publish interest rateConclusions
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6 Conclusions
In this paper we have studied a standard New-Keynesian economy where private
agents are learning, the central bank implements monetary policy through an interest
rate rule and it publishes its macroeconomic projections. To stay close to the current
practice of most of the central banks which follow this communication strategy we
have assumed that projections are obtained under the assumption that the economy
is populated by perfectly rational agents.
Our analysis has focused on the eﬀects of such a publication on the stability of
the equilibrium and on the speed of convergence of private expectations towards ra-
tionality. The main result is that the eﬀect depends on the economic variable which
is published. In particular when the central bank reveals information about its own
expected interest path, conditions for stability under learning become more strin-
gent and the speed of convergence slows down. In such a situation macroeconomic
stability and a faster process of convergence of expectations toward rationality can
be restored only if the central bank selects an interest rule that responds more ag-
gressively against inﬂation. On the contrary, the announcement of expected inﬂation
and output gap enlarges the set of policy rules which are consistent with stability
and a fast process of convergence.
Our analysis suggests that a central bank, before deciding to publish interest rate
projections, should investigate the expectation formation process of private agents
and assess how far such a mechanism is from perfect rationality. The greater the
distance, the higher the risk that the release of interest rate projections might ex-
ert adverse eﬀects on the economy. Our analysis suggests that particular attention
should be paid to those situations in which private agents, in forming their expec-
tations, are likely to put a larger weight on the announcement of the interest rate
path than on the inﬂation and output gap projections. In those cases, in fact, the
set of policy rules that guarantees stability and a fast convergence of expectations
could be even smaller than in the no announcement case.
It is ﬁnally worthwhile to notice that our analysis is not necessarily against the
publication of interest rate projections when agents are learning. If on one side we
have concluded that in this case the publication of rational interest rate projection
exerts a negative eﬀect on the economy, on the other the central bank by providing
to the public alternative interest rate projections that take into account the true ex-
pectation formation process of private agents, could strengthen the macroeconomic
stability and increase the speed of convergence of private expectations towards per-
fect rationality.References
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Appendix: Proofs of propositions
Appendix 1) The REE under contemporaneous Taylor rules
Under the set of policies
it = γ + γxxt + γππt
the economy evolves according to the following stochastic dynamic system:





























































To calculate the minimum state variable (MSV) solution, we rewrite the system
as





−1L, Q = H
−1K, S = H
−1M
The MSV solution satisﬁes
A = Q + FA
B = FBΨ + S
and, therefore,
A = (I − F)
−1 Q
vec(B) = (I − Ψ
� ⊗ F)
−1 vec(S).Appendix: Proofs of propositions
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For determinacy we need all the eigenvalues of the F matrix to be inside the
unit circle (Bullard and Mitra, 2001). One of the eigenvalues is equal to 0 and the
other two can be obtained as a solution of the characteristic polynomial
X
2 + a1X + a2.
The necessary and suﬃcient condition for determinacy is |a2| < 1 and |a1| <
1 + a2. This reduces to have









matrix to have the real part smaller than zero.
Since one of the eigenvalues of the F − I matrix is equal to −1 and the others
can be obtained from the characteristic polynomial
X
2 + a1X + a2,
where
a1 = a2 + c, with c > 0
the necessary and suﬃcient condition for E-stability, a2 > 0 and a1 > 0, reduces to
have a2 > 0, that is




It is easy to show that as ρu and ρg are smaller than 1 the previous condition





matrix to have the real part
smaller than zero.
Appendix 2) Proof of proposition 1 (Announcement of the policy path
and E-stability of the REE)
To study how the economy evolves under learning we rewrite the system as
� Hyt = � K + � L × E
∗
t yt+1 + � P × E
∗





















































1 + βρu 0






yt = � Q + � F × E
∗
t Yt+1 + � V × E
∗
t Yt+2 + � Swt,
where
� F = � H
−1� L and � V = � H
−1 � P.




matrix to have the real part smaller than zero.




2 + a1X + a2
�
and the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for E-stability are a2 > 0 and a1 > 0. As
a1 = a2 + c, with c > 0








We also need the eigenvalues of the
�
d( e F e BΨ+e V e BΨ�Ψ)
d e B − I
�
matrix to be smaller
than zero.
Proceeding as we have done for the matrix � F+� V −I, it is easy to show that when-
ever the previous condition is satisﬁed also the eigenvalues of
�
d(e F e BΨ+e V e BΨ�Ψ)
d e B − I
�
have real part smaller than zero.Appendix: Proofs of propositions
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∗
t Yt+2 + � Swt,
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−1 � P.




matrix to have the real part smaller than zero.




2 + a1X + a2
�
and the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for E-stability are a2 > 0 and a1 > 0. As
a1 = a2 + c, with c > 0








We also need the eigenvalues of the
�
d( e F e BΨ+e V e BΨ�Ψ)
d e B − I
�
matrix to be smaller
than zero.
Proceeding as we have done for the matrix � F+� V −I, it is easy to show that when-
ever the previous condition is satisﬁed also the eigenvalues of
�
d(e F e BΨ+e V e BΨ�Ψ)
d e B − I
�
have real part smaller than zero.
Appendix 3) proof of proposition 2 (Announcement of policy inten-
tions and root-t convergence)
From Marcet and Sargent (1992) it follows that a necessary condition for root-t
convergence is that the eigenvalues of � F + � V and those of
d( e F e BΨ+e V e BΨ�Ψ)
d e B have the
real part smaller than 1
2. On the other hand, agents beliefs will not converge to the
MSV solution at root-t speed if any eigenvalue of � F + � V or
d(e F e BΨ+e V e BΨ�Ψ)
d e B has real
part more than 1/2. Similarly to the proof in Appendix 2, it turns out that it is
suﬃcient to have the real part of the eigenvalues of � F + � V smaller than 1
2.





2 + a1X + a2
�
By applying the Routh theorem, the necessary and suﬃcient condition for root-t
convergence that both eigenvalues of � F + � V have real parts less than 1/2 (i.e. both
eigenvalues of � F + � V − 1
2I have negative real parts) reduces to have a1 > 0 and













Appendix 4) proof of proposition 3 (Root-t convergence under diﬀer-




















under which we have root-t convergence, we take derivatives of the two terms inside
the max operator with respect to λ1 and we show that the larger the λ1, that is the
smaller the weight to the announcement (the extreme cases of λ1 = 1 coincide with
the case of no announcement), the smaller is the S1 set, since the larger has to be
γπ in order to stay in the S1 set.Appendix: Proofs of propositions
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Appendix 4) proof of proposition 3 (Root-t convergence under diﬀer-




















under which we have root-t convergence, we take derivatives of the two terms inside
the max operator with respect to λ1 and we show that the larger the λ1, that is the
smaller the weight to the announcement (the extreme cases of λ1 = 1 coincide with
the case of no announcement), the smaller is the S1 set, since the larger has to be




















condition that is always satisﬁed for all reasonable values of αϕ (for example under
CGG (1999) parametrization αϕ = 0.3; under Woodford (2003) parametrization
αϕ = 0.15), the second term of the max function is larger for smaller λ1.
Therefore, the larger λ1, the smaller the set of (γπ,γx) combinations under which
we have root-T convergence.
Appendix 5) Speed of convergence isoquants
We look at combinations of (γπ,γx) that results in the same value for the real







is the characteristic polynomial of � F + � V − kI.
Both eigenvalues of � F + � V have real parts less than k (i.e. both eigenvalues of
� F + � V − kI have negative real parts) if and only if ak
1 > 0 and ak












Appendix 6) proof of proposition 4 (Speed of convergence and com-
munication of the path)Appendix: Proofs of propositions
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CGG (1999) parametrization αϕ = 0.3; under Woodford (2003) parametrization
αϕ = 0.15), the second term of the max function is larger for smaller λ1.
Therefore, the larger λ1, the smaller the set of (γπ,γx) combinations under which
we have root-T convergence.
Appendix 5) Speed of convergence isoquants
We look at combinations of (γπ,γx) that results in the same value for the real
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Appendix 6) proof of proposition 4 (Speed of convergence and com-
munication of the path)

















≤ k ≤ 1
We take derivatives of the two terms inside the max operator with respect to λ1
and we show that for a given k, the larger the λ1, that is the smaller the weight
to the announcement (the extreme cases of λ1 = 1 coincide with the case of no




















+ αϕ > 1
for all reasonable values of α,ϕ,β, it is ∂
∂λ1
(1−2k+β2+2αϕ)
(2k+β+λ1)αϕ < 0. Therefore, ﬁrst term
of the max function is larger for smaller λ1.
Moreover, for
1








condition that we have already seen is always satisﬁed for all reasonable values of
αϕ. Therefore, also the second term of the max function is larger for smaller λ1.
Therefore for a given γx, the larger is λ1, the smaller has to be γπ in order to
reach the same speed of convergence denoted by the k-isoquant. Or in other terms,
for a given combination of γx,γπ, the larger is λ1 the smaller is k, and the fastest
the learning process.Appendix: Proofs of propositions
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∂λ1
(1−2k+β2+2αϕ)
(2k+β+λ1)αϕ < 0. Therefore, ﬁrst term
of the max function is larger for smaller λ1.
Moreover, for
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condition that we have already seen is always satisﬁed for all reasonable values of
αϕ. Therefore, also the second term of the max function is larger for smaller λ1.
Therefore for a given γx, the larger is λ1, the smaller has to be γπ in order to
reach the same speed of convergence denoted by the k-isoquant. Or in other terms,
for a given combination of γx,γπ, the larger is λ1 the smaller is k, and the fastest
the learning process.
Appendix 7) proof of proposition 5 (Announcing expected inﬂation
and output gap)
Under learning the economy evolves according to the system of equation
� � Hyt = � � K + � � L × E
∗
t yt+1 + � � P × E
∗
t yt+2 + � � Mwt,
and the � � H, � � L and � � P matrices that are relevant in order to study stability under
learning are






























yt = � � Q + � � F × E
∗
t yt+1 + � � V × E
∗
t yt+2 + � � Swt,
where
� � F = � � H
−1 � � L, � � V = � � H
−1� � P.
Necessary and suﬃcient condition for E-stability is that the eigenvalues of the
� � F + � � V − I matrix have the real part smaller than zero.




2 + a1X + a2
�
.
All eigenvalues of � � F + � � V −I have real parts smaller than zero if and only if a1 > 0
and a2 > 0, but since
a1 = a2 + c






(1 − β2λ2)(1 − λ2)





In order to determine the eﬀect of announcing only the expected inﬂation andAppendix: Proofs of propositions
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and a2 > 0, but since
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(1 − β2λ2)(1 − λ2)





In order to determine the eﬀect of announcing only the expected inﬂation and
expected output gap, we impose λ1 = 1 and obtain the following condition:
γπ > h − zγx
with
h = λ2 −












we have that the larger the weight to the projection (the lower λ2), the lower the
intercept h and the steeper the slope (in absolute value) z.
Therefore, for all values of the parameters, we have that by announcing the ex-
pected inﬂation and output gap, the combinations of (γx,γπ) that imply E-instability
is a subset of those obtained when the central bank does not announce the inﬂation
and output gap.
In order to study the speed of convergence, we consider the k-isoquant obtained
from the � � F + � � V − kI matrix. We look at combinations of (γπ,γx) that result in
the same value for the real part of the largest eigenvalue of the � � F + � � V matrix. Let










is the characteristic polynomial of
�
� � F + � � V − kI
�
. Both eigenvalues of � � F + � � V have
real parts less than k (i.e. both eigenvalues of � � F + � � V −kI have negative real parts)
if and only if ak
1 > 0 and ak
2 > 0, that is
γπ >
(1 + β2 + 2αϕ)λ2 − 2k
αϕ(2k + λ1 + βλ2)
−
2k + λ1 − β2λ2







(λ2 − k)(β2λ2 − k)




γx.Appendix: Proofs of propositions
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expected output gap, we impose λ1 = 1 and obtain the following condition:
γπ > h − zγx
with
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we have that the larger the weight to the projection (the lower λ2), the lower the
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real parts less than k (i.e. both eigenvalues of � � F + � � V −kI have negative real parts)
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1 > 0 and ak
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−
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≤ k ≤ 1
Following the steps suggested in the proof of proposition 4, we obtain that the
larger the λ2, the larger is γk
π.
Appendix 8) proof of proposition 6 (Publishing interest rate, inﬂation
and output gap projections)
Condition for E-stability becomes






(1 − β2λ2)(1 − λ2)





Here we are interested on the combinations of λ1 and λ2 that make announcement
worse than no announcement.
Under no announcement we have




















(1 − β2λ2)(1 − λ2)
αϕ(1 + βλ2)(1 + λ1)
< 0
forAppendix: Proofs of propositions
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for
0 ≤ λ1 < 2 −


















(1 − λ2) + αϕ(1 − λ2) + (1 − λ2)αβϕλ2 ≥ 0




















(ϕit+j − ϕπt+j+1 − gt+j)
E
P




t yt+j, where i = 1 for the it and i = 2 for πt and xt
as
A0Yt = K + A1E
∗
t Yt+1 + ... + AT−1E
∗
t Yt+T−1 + ATE
∗
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0 ≤ λ1 < 2 −
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t yt+j, where i = 1 for the it and i = 2 for πt and xt
as
A0Yt = K + A1E
∗
t Yt+1 + ... + AT−1E
∗
t Yt+T−1 + ATE
∗
































Since the perceived law of motion (PLM) is
E
∗
tYt+T = A + BΨ
Twt
we can rewrite the previous expression as











Therefore, the actual law of motion (ALM) is
Yt = A
−1
0 K + A
−1












And the mappings from the PLM to the ALM are
T (A) − A = A
−1
0 (A1 + ... + AT)A − A




A1BΨ + ... + ATBΨ
T�
− B
To study the E-stability conditions we just need to focus on the A
−1
0 (A1 + ... + AT)
matrix, where












β + β2 + ... + βT−1�
.





0 (A1 + A2 + ... + AT−1 + AT) − I
�
matrix have the real part smaller
than zero.




0 (A1 + A2 + ... + AT−1 + AT) − I
�
is
(X + 1)(X2 + a1X + a2)
(ϕγx + αϕγπ + 1)
2
Necessary and suﬃcient conditions for E-stability are
a1,a2 > 0
and sinceAppendix: Proofs of propositions
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Necessary and suﬃcient conditions for E-stability are
a1,a2 > 0
and since
a1 = a2 + c
with c > 0, it is suﬃcient that a2 > 0, that is
γπ >
Tλ2




























(1 + (T − 1)λ1)
2 ≥ 0
for 0 ≤ λ1 ≤ 1, the longer the path announced, the larger the region of E-instability.
Appendix 10) Proof of proposition 8 (Expectations-based policy rule)
Under the set of policies
it = γ + γxEtxt+1 + γπEtπt+1
the economy evolves according to the following stochastic dynamic system:





































ϕ(1 − γπ) (1 − ϕγx)
�
or
Yt = Q + F × E
∗
tYt+1 + Swt,Appendix: Proofs of propositions
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a1 = a2 + c
with c > 0, it is suﬃcient that a2 > 0, that is
γπ >
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Appendix 10) Proof of proposition 8 (Expectations-based policy rule)
Under the set of policies
it = γ + γxEtxt+1 + γπEtπt+1
the economy evolves according to the following stochastic dynamic system:





































ϕ(1 − γπ) (1 − ϕγx)
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or





−1L, Q = H
−1K, S = H
−1M
As shown in Bullard and Mitra (2002), necessary and suﬃcient condition for
E-stability is




Under announcement of the policy path we rewrite the system as
Yt = � Q + � F × E
∗
tYt+1 + � V × E
∗
tYt+2 + � Swt.
Necessary and suﬃcient condition for E-stability is that the eigenvalues of the
� F + � V − I matrix have real part smaller than zero.
Since the characteristic polynomial of � F + � V − I is
X
2 + a1X + a2
the necessary and suﬃcient condition for the eigenvalues of the � F + � V matrix to
have real part smaller than one is a1,a2 > 0. As a1 = a2 + c, where c > 0, the
necessary and suﬃcient condition for the eigenvalues of the � F + � V matrix to have
real part smaller than one is just a2 > 0, that is
γπ >
2
(1 + λ1)
−
(1 − β)
α
γx.